HORIZONTAL MERGERS IN SPATIALLY DIFFERENTIATED NONCOOPERATIVE MARKETS -- Web of Science 5.0

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HORIZONTAL MERGERS IN SPATIALLY DIFFERENTIATED NONCOOPERATIVE MARKETS
MCAFEE RP, SIMONS JJ, WILLIAMS MA
JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS 40 (4): 349-358 DEC 1992

Document type: Article

Language: English

Cited References: 19

Times Cited: 7

Abstract:
We present a Cournot-Nash model of horizontal mergers between firms that engage in spatial price discrimination. The model extends the analysis of such mergers as presented in the US Department of Justice Merger Guidelines. Rather than conclude the evaluation of such a merger with an estimate of the post-merger HHI, as is done in the Merger Guidelines, our model yields an estimate of the increases in the equilibrium, post-merger delivered prices caused by the merger.

KeyWords Plus:
COMPETITION, EQUILIBRIUM, INDUSTRY, COURNOT, LOSSES

Addresses:
MCAFEE RP, UNIV TEXAS,DEPT ECON,AUSTIN,TX 78712
WACHTELL LIPTON ROSEN & KATZ,NEW YORK,NY 10171
ANAL GRP IC LOS ANGELES,LOS ANGELES,CA 90017

Publisher:
BLACKWELL PUBL LTD, OXFORD

IDS Number:
KA034

ISSN:
0022-1821

Article 11 of 13

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