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ON GAMES WITH STOCHASTICALLY DEPENDENT STRATEGIES
KREPS VL
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY 23 (1): 57-64 1994

Document type: Article

Language: English

Cited References: 6

Times Cited: 1

Abstract:
Bimatrix games under the supposition of dependent randomization devices realizing the mixed strategies of players are considered (e.g. the players may use the same pseudorandom numbers generator). We analyze the structure of possible types of dependence, examine the structure of Nash Equilibria sets yielded by these types and show that the unique type of dependence for which any matrix game has a Nash Equilibrium is stochastic independence.

Addresses:
KREPS VL, RUSSIAN ACAD SCI,INST ECON & MATH,SERPUCHOVSKAJA 38,ST PETERSBURG 198147,RUSSIA

Publisher:
PHYSICA VERLAG GMBH, HEIDELBERG

IDS Number:
NF102

ISSN:
0020-7276

Article 30 of 40

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