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Uniqueness and efficiency of Nash equilibrium in a family of randomly generated repeated games
Necco C, Silvestri M, Quintas L
COMPUTERS & MATHEMATICS WITH APPLICATIONS 43 (10-11): 1425-1440 MAY-JUN 2002

Document type: Article

Language: English

Cited References: 9

Times Cited: 0

Abstract:
This paper describes the results of an analysis of the Nash equilibrium in randomly generated repeated games. We study two families of games: symmetric bimatrix games G(A, B) with B = A(T) and nonsyrnmetric bimatrix games (the first includes the classical games of prisoner dilemma, battle of the sexes, and chickens). We use pure strategies, implemented by automata of size two, and different strategy domination criteria. We observe that, in this environment, the uniqueness and efficiency of equilibria outcomes is the typical result. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

Author Keywords:
game theory, repeated games, Nash-equilibrium, automata

Addresses:
Necco C, Univ Nacl San Luis, Dept Informat, Fac Cs Fis Matemat & Nat, Inst Matemat Aplicada, Ejercito Andes 950, RA-5700 San Luis, Argentina
Univ Nacl San Luis, Dept Informat, Fac Cs Fis Matemat & Nat, Inst Matemat Aplicada, RA-5700 San Luis, Argentina

Publisher:
PERGAMON-ELSEVIER SCIENCE LTD, OXFORD

IDS Number:
546TQ

ISSN:
0898-1221

Article 3 of 40

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